Contracts by Grier, Manton M.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 4 Article 2 
1968 
Contracts 
Manton M. Grier 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Contracts, 20 S. C. L. Rev. 536 (1968). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CONTRACTS
I. THE TWILIGHT ZONE BETWEEN TORT AND CONTRACT
Since the last survey issue, several cases have been de-
cided in that grey area of the law where contract and tort
principles overlap. Many cases of this type have been pri-
marily concerned with the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance, it being generally held that there is no
liability in tort for nonfeasance; that is, when the defendant
has refused to perform his contractual obligations, the plain-
tiff's remedy lies in contract, but when the defendant per-
forms his obligations poorly, whether contractually obligated
or not, the plaintiff's action lies in tort. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Arnold' was such a case.
In this case the plaintiff insurance company had refused
to defend a lawsuit filed against Arnold, one of their auto-
mobile liability policyholders, and brought an action seeking
a declaratory judgment of non-coverage. The defendant coun-
terclaimed setting up two causes of action. The first alleged
the insurer's failure to settle and its refusal to defend, and
the second alleged willfulness and negligence in failing to
defend or settle the suit. The plaintiff moved to strike the
defendant's second cause of action along with certain other
portions of the defendant's counterclaim. The court granted
the plaintiff's motion in part and struck the defendant's
second cause of action pointing out that under the law of
South Carolina the two actions are mutually exclusive. 2 The
first action is essentially one for breach of contract 3 in wrong-
fully refusing to defend the insured as required by the terms
of the policy. The second action is in tort4 and arises either
when the insurer assumes the defense negligently or un-
reasonably refuses to settle the suit within the liability limits
of the policy. Here the plaintiff had denied coverage from
the start, and having never attempted to defend the insured
it could not be held liable in tort for a negligent defense.5
1. 276 F. Supp. 765 (D.S.C. 1967).
2. See Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 374, 380-85,
120 S.E.2d 217, 220-22 (1961).
3. Id.
4. See Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 374, 380-85,
120 S.E.2d 217, 220-22 (1961) ; Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E.2d 491 (1931).
5. It is of course possible to join a contract and a tort action. It is im-
possible, however, to defend and refuse to defend at the same time. Thus,
the two actions here, one in contract and one in tort, are mutually exclusive.
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One exception to the rule of no liability in tort for non-
feasance occurs when the defendant misrepresents his in-
tention to perform his obligations under a contract entered
into with the plaintiff.6 The plaintiff in Davis v. Upton7
seemingly proceeded under such a theory in an attempt to
recover a down payment which he made on a house to be
constructed by one of the co-defendants. 8 The plaintiff was
told by the defendants when the contract was signed that his
deposit would be refunded if he was unable to obtain a
mortgage. Subsequently the plaintiff's application for a mort-
gage was turned down but his deposit was not returned, and
he brought this suit. The trial judge granted the defendant's
motion for a nonsuit on the ground that there was no evi-
dence of fraud and deceit to support a jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiff.9 On appeal, the supreme court said that
"there [was] no evidence in the record from which it could
be inferred that the statement made by [the respondant's 0
agent] was knowingly false and made by him with the in-
tention of refusing to refund the deposit made by appellant
if a loan could not be obtained."" Thus the court reasoned
that the plaintiff having proved no more than a breach of
contract could not be allowed to recover on a theory of fraud
and deceit since "a mere breach of contract does not con-
stitute fraud."'
12
The issue of fraud was touched on lightly in Morrison V.
Chrysler Corp.'3 There the plaintiff purchased an automobile
equipped with a specially adapted racing engine from one
of the defendant's local dealers. The car subsequently proved
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 637 (3d ed. 1964).
7. 250 S.C. 288, 157 S.E.2d 567 (1967).
8. Three defendants were involved: Upton, agent for Suburban Build-
ers, Suburban Builders, and United Mortgagee Servicing Corporation. A
default judgment was entered against Upton and Suburban Builders, who
did not answer the complaint.
9. The elements of fraud are difficult to prove. Here the plaintiff
would have to prove that the defendant made a material representation
intending that the plaintiff act thereon, that the defendant knew that the
representation was false when he made it, that the plaintiff did not know
the statement was false, that the plaintiff relied on the statement, that the
plaintiff was justified in his reliance, and that the plaintiff suffered dam-
age as a result of his reliance. Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 482, 109
S.E.2d 5, 7 (1959).
10. United Mortgagee Servicing Corporation.
11. 250 S.C. 288, 292, 157 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1967).
12. Id. The court's statement here is in line with the case of Jones v.
Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 487-88, 109 S.E.2d 5, 10-11 (1959), which was cited
by the court.
13. 270 F. Supp. 107 (D.S.C. 1967).
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to be defective 4 and was repaired by the dealer in accordance
with the terms of the Chrysler passenger car warranty which
limited the defendant's obligations "to repairing or, at its op-
tion, replacing any part or parts of vehicle that prove to be de-
fective ... ."1 These repairs, which included replacement of
the engine, resulted in a certain amount of inconvenience to
the plaintiff. He was, however, provided with another automo-
bile to use while his was being repaired. Subsequently, the
plaintiff brought an action in the United States District Court
seeking to recover damages on a theory of breach of warranty
and fraud. The plaintiff's theory of fraud was apparently
based on his contention that the defendant sold the automobile
knowing that it would not be able to carry out its obligations
under the warranty.'0 The court, however, found that the war-
ranty had not been breached and dismissed the plaintiff's
allegation of fraud stating that "[t]here exists here no false
representation of Chrysler as to its product."'17 Moreover, the
court stated that Chrysler's failure to repair the car with
the speed to which the plaintiff felt himself entitled did not
entitle the plaintiff to damages under a theory of fraud.
II. BREACH OF WARRANTY
As noted above, the court in the Morrison case found that
the defendant had not breached its passenger car warranty.
The court stated that when the manufacturer's obligations
under the warranty are limited to the repair or replacement
of defective parts, the buyer must show a refusal or failure
by the manufacturer to repair or replace a defective part
before an action of breach of warranty can be maintained.
Moreover, the court concluded that inconvenience is not an
element of damages in an action for breach of warranty.' 8
14. The last repair job included replacement of the engine which had
blown and took approximately six weeks. Prior to this six week period
the plaintiff's car was in the repair shop for twelve days.
15. 270 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D.S.C. 1967).
16. It was shown that the defendant's dealers were not familiar with the
high performance hemi-head engine, such as was involved here, and that
they were inexperienced with respect to the maintenance and repair of such
engines. The plaintiff's allegation that the car was a used one and not
new was not discussed by the court.
17. 270 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D.S.C. 1967).
18. Damages for injury to person or property proximately resulting from
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In the case of Frasher v. Cofer19 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that there is no implied warranty of fitness
in the sale of real estate and that this rule extends to the
premises conveyed as well as the vendor's title. The plaintiff
vendee sought to recover for money spent in repairing a de-
fective furnace in a house recently purchased from the de-
fendant vendor. The supreme court discussed briefly the
majority and minority positions2 0 with respect to implied
warranty in the sale of real estate and concluded that the
plaintiff's complaint stated no cause of action under either
rule.
III. IMPLIED CONTRACTS
Two cases involving implied contracts also arose during
the past year. The case of Singleton v. Collins21 was an
action by an attorney to recover fees for services rendered
to the defendants, a father and his son, in connection with
two separate actions against the son's former wife. The
father contended that he did not employ the plaintiff and
both defendants contested the reasonable value of the services
rendered. The cause was referred to a special referee who,
on the facts, found that the fa-nr did engage the services
of the plaintiff and assessed the reasonable value of the
plaintiff's services at $4,500. From a decision of the trial court
affirming the referee's findings of fact, the defendants ap-
pealed. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the su-
preme court stated:
An attorney has a right to be paid for professional serv-
ices rendered, and where there is no express contract,
the law will imply one. Whether the services were ren-
dered, and their value, are matters of fact to be decided
19. 160 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1968).
20. The majority of jurisdictions follow the doctrine of caveat emptor
with respect to sales of realty. A few states, however, hold that when a
recent purchaser of new residential property is injured by defects of which
the builder-vendor knew or should have known, but of which the vendee was
unaware and had no reason to know, the vendor-builder will be liable. In
the present case the house was not a new one and the vendee had not built
the house. Thus the plaintiff stated no cause of action under the minority
holding. Although South Carolina sides with the majority, the court stated
that when failure to disclose defects was tantamount to fraud, the vendor
would be held liable. The court indicated that such a result would be
consistent with the early cases of Mitchell v. Pinckney, 13 S.C. 203 (1879)
and Lessly v. Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887), which excepted fraud
from the operation of the rule of no implied warranty in the sale of realty.
21. 161 S.E.2d 246 (S.C. 1968).
19681
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by the jury, or here by the court below, and no appeal
lies therefrom if the findings of fact are supported by
any competent evidence. Gradon v. Stokes, 24 S.C. 483.22
In Braswell v. Heart of Spartanburg Motel23 the plaintiff
sought to recover the reasonable value of his services in pre-
treating the defendant's motel for termite control. The trial
court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; however,
the supreme court reversed holding that this was error since
conflicting testimony was presented on the question of
whether the defendant requested the plaintiff to perform the
services.
The Braswell case also involved the question of whether the
plaintiff's allegation in his complaint that he performed the
services at the request of the defendant operated to limit his
claim to one involving express contract. The court concluded
that it did not and indicated that if the plaintiff could prove
facts giving rise to an implied contract he would be en-
titled to recover the fair value of the work performed for the
defendant.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
The question of ambiguity was presented in the case of
Carolina Ceramics, Inc. v. Carolina Pipeline Co.24 The plain-
tiff brought suit to recover for alleged overpayment made
under a contract of sale with the defendant, a supplier of
natural gas. At the time the contract was signed, the de-
fendant had not yet obtained a source of supply, but was
in the process of negotiating with two companies. Under the
contract the price of the gas paid by the plaintiff was to be
geared to the defendant's sources of supply by the following
escalator clause:
In the event that the Commodity Charge for gas a"
purchased by Seller from Transcontinental Gas Pipelinv
Company is increased above or decreased below 24.0 cent
per MCF, or the Commodity Charge for gas as pu!
chased by Seller from the Southern Natural Gas Com-
pany is increased above or decreased below 18.5 cents
per MCF, the amount of such increases or decreases
22. Id. at 247.
23. 159 S.E.2d 848 (S.C. 1968).
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shall be added to or subtracted from, as the case may
be, the price of gas to Buyer as set forth herein.25
Subsequently, the defendant completed the necessary arrange-
ments with one of the above mentioned suppliers and began
performing its obligations under the contract with the plain-
tiff. Approximately three and one half years later the de-
fendant began receiving gas from its second source and at
that time it began supplying gas to plaintiff exclusively from
the new source. Since the commodity charge for the new
source of supply had increased approximately five cents per
MCF over the contract period, the price paid by the plaintiff
for gas under the contract was increased a like amount by
operation of the escalator clause. In his complaint the plain-
tiff contended that the defendant's original source of supply
had not increased in price and thus that the additional charge
had not been warranted by the contract of sale. The trial
judge concluded that the terms of the escalator clause were
clear and unambiguous and held that the additional charge
"was fully justified and clearly anticipated by the escalation
clause." 2 6 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial saying that the escalator
clause was ambiguous because, among other things, it did not
specify the source of supply which would be used to compute
the price of the gas. The court indicated that the intent of
the parties should be ascertained at a new trial.
The case of Heaton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.27 involved the construction of an exclusionary
clause in an automobile liability insurance policy which
excluded from coverage "any accident arising out of the
operation of an automobile business." The term automobile
business was defined by the policy as "the business of selling,
repairing, servicing, storing, or parking . .. automobiles."
The insured was a parking lot attendant and the accident
occurred while he was moving a customer's automobile. The
defendant insurance company denied coverage and refused
to defend a suit brought by the owner of the damaged auto-
mobile against the insured. Subsequently, the insured and
his judgment creditor brought an action to recover the
amount of the judgment suffered by the insured. On a mo-
25. Id. at 180.
26. Id. at 181.
27. 278 F. Supp. 725 (D.S.C. 1968).
1968]
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tion by the defendant insurance company for summary judg-
ment, the district court held that the accident in question
was plainly excluded by the terms of the policy. The court
said that even though insurance contracts are to be strictly
construed against the insurer, the courts can not rewrite a
contract so as to nullify exclusions clearly expressed and that
language is to be given its plain, ordinary and popular mean-
ing.
V. SET OFF
In Gambrell v. Cox 28 the plaintiff, the receiver of a bank-
rupt insurance company, brought an accounting to recover
the net premiums 29 held by an agency of the bankrupt firm.
The agency counterclaimed asserting that certain unearned
premiums3o held by the bankrupt constituted an offset be-
tween the parties at the time of receivership. The plaintiff
receiver then moved to strike certain portions of the de-
fendant's answer and demurred to the counterclaim. The
plaintiff's motion and demurrer were overruled by the trial
court, and he appealed. The supreme court affirmed the de-
cision of the lower court in result only, pointing out that the
defendant would be required to show that a right to the
premiums involved existed in it at the time of insolvency.
The court said that normally unearned premiums collected
by the agency and paid to the company are owed by the
company to the policy holders alone, and not the agency,
upon cancellation of the policy. Moreover, the court pointed
out that any assignment of claims by policy holders after
receivership would be ineffectual since "it is well settled in
this jurisdiction that a debtor will not be permitted to set off
against his debt a claim or claims assigned to him after the
insolvency or receivership of his creditor."
31
In Gambrell v. South Carolina National Bank 2 the plaintiff
appealed a decision of the circuit court on the ground that
the court erred in sustaining the defendant's alternative plea
of offset to his action on a contract for a money judgment.
28. 250 S.C. 228, 157 S.E.2d 233 (1967).
29. The net premiums could be found by substracting commission pay-
ments and unearned premiums from the total premiums.
30. Unearned premiums are those already paid to the company on a
policy subsequently cancelled before expiration.
31. 250 S.C. 228, 235, 157 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1967).
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The supreme court held that this question had become moot
since the plaintiff left "unchallenged the [lower] court's find-
ing that the defendant was not indebted to the plaintiff under
the contract."38 Thus the court concluded that "there [was]
no debt against which an offset could be allowed . ... ",4
VI. OPTION CONTRACT - LIMITATION OF ACTION
In Lindler v. Adcock38 the plaintiff sought specific per-
formance of a 1949 agreement made with the defendant's
intestate. The agreement provided that the surviving party
would have an option to purchase the decedent's interest in
a common tenancy at the original cost of the property. The
issue presented to the court was whether the plaintiff had
seasonably accepted the option. The trial court found in
favor of the decedent's heirs and the plaintiff appealed. The
supreme court determined that the plaintiff had accepted
the option, but had done so over nine and one half years
after it had ripened. Accordingly, the court held that the
plaintiff was guilty of laches such as to bar his right to
specific performance. The court emphasized the fact that
the property had appreciated considerably since the date of
the agreement saying that "[t]he argument . . . that plain-
tiff should not be permitted to wait until the price is right
before accepting the offer has much appeal."3 6
VII. ALTERATION OF AN INSTRUMENT
In Brown v. Mims 3 7 the plaintiff lessor brought an action
against his lessee and a third party for a declaratory judg-
ment concerning the validity of a written lease with an option
to purchase. Both the circuit court and a special referee
found that the defendant lessee had materially altered the
lease agreement by drafting an additional page to the original
instrument which added a third party to the contract and
added additional terms and conditions to the option to pur-
chase.38 The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court in favor of the plaintiff holding that the material
alteration "operated to destroy any rights which [the de-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 250 S.C. 383, 158 S.E.2d 192 (1967).
36. Id. at 388, 158 S.E.2d at 195.
37. 159 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. 1968).
38. The defendant had retained all copies of the original instrument.
19681
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fendant] had under the executory provisions of the con-
tract.180 The decision of the court here would seem to be
in accord with the general law on the subject.40
VIII. DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS
In South Carolina, rescission for nonperformance is gen-
erally justified only when such nonperformance is substantial
and fundamental. 41 Recission for delay is usually allowed only
when time is of the essence,42 and when no time for perform-
ance is set by the contract, a reasonable time is implied,43
though time may be made essential by subsequent notice to
that effect.4-
The case of General Sprinkler Corp. v. Loris Industrial
Developers, Inc. 45 was a reaffirmation of the above mentioned
principles. The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to
install a sprinkler system in the defendant's building. A special
provision of the contract required the plaintiff to obtain fire
insurance coverage for the building from an insurance com-
pany affiliated with the Associated Factory Mutual Group;
however, the contract made no mention of a deadline either
for obtaining the insurance40 or installing the sprinkler sys-
tem. The plaintiff encountered some difficulty in trying to
obtain the desired insurance coverage,47 but continued to make
every reasonable effort toward that end. Approximately two
months after the contract had been signed the defendant
through its own efforts obtained insurance coverage from
one of the Associated Factory Mutual Group, and at that
time notified the plaintiff that it had cancelled its contract
with them. Three days later the defendant signed a contract
39. Id. at 248.
40. See 4 AAs. Jun. 2d Alteration of Instruments § 9 (1962); 3 C.J.S.
Alteration of Instruments §§ 16, 30(h) (1936). These articles were cited
by the court.
41. E.g., Elliot v. Snyder, 246 S.C. 186, 143 S.E.2d 374 (1965); Smith
v. First Provident Corp., 245 S.C. 509, 141 S.E.2d 646 (1965).
42. E.g., Davis v. Cardell, 237 S.C. 88, 115 S.E.2d 649 (1960).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 271 F. Supp. 551 (D.S.C. 1967). The case of Jaycee Fish Co. v. Can-
narella, 279 F. Supp. 67 (D.S.C. 1968), was decided during the survey
period. Because it involved well settled principles of novation it has been
reported only in this footnote.
46. The defendant's building was covered by a temporary insurance pol-
icy prior to his procurement of coverage with a member of the Factory
Mutual Group.
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with another sprinkler systems contractor. The United States
District Court, where the plaintiff brought this action to re-
cover damages for breach of contract, concluded that the
defendant had been unjustified in rescinding his contract
with the plaintiff. The court said that since no time was
set for performance by the contract, the plaintiff had a reason-
able time in which to perform and this reasonable time had
not expired when the defendant attempted to cancel the
contract.48 Moreover, the court stated that the plaintiff, hav-
ing obtained satisfactory insurance, was not justified in re-
scinding the contract because of the defendant's failure to
obtain similar insurance.
MANTON M. GRIER
48. The plaintiff testified that it would take 30 days to install the
sprinder system. The defendant notified the plaintiff that the contract
was cancelled on Nov. 22, 1963, yet the system was not completed until the
latter part of January, 1964. Moreover, work on the system could not begin
until after the town had completed the construction of a new water tower.
The tower was completed during the latter part of December, 1963.
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